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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent economic crisis was especially damaging to state and local governments’ financial 
situations.  One suggested solution to these difficulties is to consolidate smaller political 
jurisdictions into larger ones to reduce costs. This paper presents a theoretical model for the 
determination of wages and salaries in the public sector with implications for the variation of 
public sector salaries across jurisdictions of different sizes.  Data is presented for public school 
teachers’ salaries in Illinois by district size which shows that salaries are higher in larger 
districts.  This would seem to suggest that consolidating smaller school districts into larger ones 
will result in higher salaries, leading to the question: Will political consolidation really save 
money? 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
conomists have frequently discussed the differences between the economic marketplace and the 
political market in various contexts.  A positive economic analysis of the political process involved in 
government regulation, first suggested by Stigler (1971) and extended by Peltzman (1976) built on the 
previous work of Downs (1957) and Olson (1965).  These discussions center on the notion of interest groups seeking 
favorable treatment from a regulatory agency.  At the simplest level, the groups are consumers and producers; and 
the question is which group will be relatively more successful in increasing its wealth through the political process.  
Another group whose influence might be considered is the employees of the regulated firms.  A case in which 
employees are more directly an interest group in the political process is in public employment.  The wages of public 
employees are directly a political decision, and one may ask whether, and to what extent, employees can influence 
their wages through the political process. 
 
This paper applies the economic theory of political behavior to the public sector labor market.  It will be 
argued that the political support maximization model of political behavior is a useful framework within which to 
view the determination of public employees’ wages.  The theoretical model asserts that some government agency, 
such as a school board, responsible for the provision of a public service has the power to tax constituents within its 
jurisdiction and to set wages for its employees.  Members of the government agency attempt to maximize their 
political support.  Support from citizens depends on the taxes imposed to finance a given level of service and the 
uninterrupted provision of the service.  Employees offer support in return for higher wages and may attempt to 
influence support from citizens by threatening disruption of the service.  The agency sets wages and taxes so as to 
maximize its political support from constituents and employees.  The model suggests that the relative success of 
employees or constituents in this political process depends on the characteristics of the community.   
 
LABOR IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
Many previous studies have examined a variety of issues concerning labor in the public sector.  Ashenfelter 
(1971) and Ehrenberg (1973b) examined the effect of the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF) on the 
wages of firemen.  Ashenfelter (1971) notes the political activity of the union and then proceeds, in the manner 
suggested by Lewis (1963), to determine the effect of the IAFF.  Ehrenberg (1973b) extends Ashenfelter’s analysis 
within a supply and demand framework by adding variables including whether fire department services are 
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administered by a city manager, fire commissioner, or city council.  This reflects, at least partially, the political 
consideration that a professional manager may be more able in the wage negotiation process and less subject to 
political pressures.   
 
Studies which examine the appropriate model within which to view public sector wage determination 
include Ehrenberg (1973a) and Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg (1975) which derive their results from a utility-
maximizing model in which utility is a function of publicly and privately produced goods and services.  Niskenen 
(1971) develops a theory of the output and pricing decisions of a government bureau providing a public service 
within a representative government.  Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld (1979) review the literature which argues 
that the public sector will grow due to the influence of public employees in the political process and provide a model 
of public employment and wage determination, including both the political and economic power of government 
employees and the limitations on that power from private sector mobility.  Anable (1974) proposes a model of wage 
determination in public employment based on a range theory of wage negotiations.  Barr and Davis (1966) propose a 
theory of local government expenditures incorporating political considerations following Downs (1957) ideas which 
presumes that candidates who propose a platform of expenditures equal to that level desired by the median voter will 
be elected.   
 
A MODEL OF PUBLIC SECTOR WAGE DETERMINATION 
 
These propositions about the political support offered by employees and citizens can be formalized in a 
model of political support maximization by the governmental agency presented in Heiney (2011).  It is argued 
previously that employees’ support will increase in response to higher wages offered by the agency.  Then agency’s 
perception of the probability that an employee will support it, p1, can be described by a function, 
 
p1 = p1 (w), with ∂p1/∂w > 0 and ∂
2
p1/∂w
2 
< 0.                                              (1) 
 
The agency is more uncertain of citizens’ positions, that is, uncertain about the amount of support expected 
from citizens in response to any proposed tax increase to finance higher wages.  This uncertainty can be described 
by a function showing the agency’s perception of the probability, p2, that a citizen will vote favorably at various 
levels of taxes with other factors which influence citizens’ support, such as uninterrupted provision of the service, 
held constant.  If P is the base of the tax on each citizen and t is the tax rate,  
 
p2 = p2 (tP), with ∂p2/∂(tP) < 0 and ∂
2
p2/∂(tP)
2 
< 0.                                        (2) 
 
Support from citizens depends not only on the level of taxes but also on the uninterrupted provision of the 
service.  Disruption of the service will reduce support from citizens, other factors held constant.  Thus, employees 
can influence political support by threatening to disrupt service is a wage increase is not granted.  Service can be 
disrupted in various ways and to various degrees.  For simplicity, consider disruption in the form of a strike.  The 
probability that employees will strike is lower, the higher the wage the agency offers.  Let pd indicate the probability 
of disruption, where  
 
pd = pd(w), with ∂pd/∂w < 0 and  ∂
2
pd/ ∂w
2
 > 0.                                               (3) 
 
The amount of disruption expected to result at different wage levels depends not only on the probability 
that disruption will occur but also on t he percentage of the population utilizing the service, that is, the percentage 
for which a strike will be disruptive, times the inconvenience to each.  Let nd indicate the number of citizens using 
the service; n2, the total population; and d, the inconvenience to each person using the service if service is 
interrupted.  Then, expected disruption per capita is given by 
 
E(D) = pd (nd/n2) d.                                                                                          (4) 
 
Offering a higher wage pays political rewards in terms of lower expected disruption, but the effect of a 
higher wage offer depends not only on how much the probability of disruption falls but also on nd/n2 and d, that is,  
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∂E(D) /∂w = (nd/n2) d (∂pd/∂w).                                                                         (5) 
 
The payoff from a given increase in w will be smaller if nd/n2 or d is smaller, given  
 
∂pd/∂w. 
 
So, the probability that a citizen will support the agency is a function of the level of taxes imposed by the 
agency and the expected disruption which will result from the agency’s actions. 
 
p2 = p2 (tP, E(D)), with ∂p2/∂(tP) < 0 and ∂
2
p2/∂(tP)
2 
< 0 
 
                                     ∂p2/∂E(D) < 0 and ∂
2
p2/∂E(D)
2 
< 0                               (6) 
 
The agency’s objective is to set the wage paid to employees and the tax rate imposed on citizens so as to 
maximize political support.  For simplicity, assume as usual that different forms of support can be transformed into 
the one dimensional measure votes, V.  If the number of employees is n1 and the number of citizens is n2, then 
expected votes from employees, V1, is n1p1; and expected votes from citizens, V2, is n2p2. 
 
The agency seeks to maximize the function,  
 
V = V1 + V2 = n1 p1 (w) + n2 p2(tP, E(D)).                                                          (7) 
 
In doing so the agency operates under a budget constraint that expenditures must equal receipts, 
 
n2 tP + O =  wn1 + pxX,                                                                                       (8) 
 
where O is revenue from sources other than taxes on citizens, px is the price of non-labor inputs, and X is the 
quantity of non-labor inputs. 
 
If the agency cannot substitute non-labor for labor resources in response to an increase in w and if other 
sources of revenue are fixed, then the change in t necessary to finance a one unit increase in w is  
 
∂t/∂w = n1/n2P.                                                                                                  (9) 
 
A one dollar increase in w will cost n1 dollars and require an increase in the tax rate of n1/n2P.   
 
The agency sets w and t to maximize the Lagrangian, 
 
L = n1p1 (w) + n2 p2(tP, pd(w) (nd/n2)d) + λ (n2 tP + O -  wn1 - pxX).               (10) 
 
The first order conditions for a maximum are 
 
∂L/∂w = n1∂p1/∂w + nd ∂p2/∂E(D) d ∂pd/∂w - λn1 = 0                                       (11) 
 
∂L/∂t = n2 ∂p2/∂(tP) P + λn2  P = 0                                                                   (12) 
 
∂L/∂λ = n2 tP + O -  wn1 - pxX = 0.                                                                   (13) 
 
The second order conditions for a maximum are fulfilled, given the signs of the second order partial 
derivatives specified above.  
 
From expression (11), 
 
n1 ∂p1/∂w + nd ∂p2/∂E(D) d ∂pd/∂w = λn1                                                                                      (14) 
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The left-hand side of (14) is the marginal vote product of an increase in w.  The first term indicates the 
number of additional votes from employees which results from a one dollar increase in w.  The second term is the 
number of additional votes from citizens forthcoming from the fact that a one dollar increase in w reduces expected 
disruption.  The right-hand side of (14) is the marginal vote cost of an increase in w.  A one dollar increase in w will 
cost n1 dollars, and λ is the marginal vote opportunity cost of public expenditures.  Expression (14), therefore, 
indicates that the wage paid to employees will be set so that the marginal vote product equals the marginal vote cost, 
that is, the agency will increase wages until the additional votes generated by the last dollar increase in w are equal 
to the additional votes lost by spending the last dollar on an increase in w instead of putting it to some other vote 
generating use, such as reducing taxes. 
 
From expression (12), 
 
- n2 ∂p2/∂(tP) P = λn2  P .                                                                                                   (15) 
 
Here the left-hand side is the marginal vote product of a decrease in t, that is, the increase in the number of 
citizens’ votes which results from a one unit decrease in t.  The right-hand side is the marginal vote cost of a 
decrease in t, that is, the decrease in votes which results from a one unit decrease in t, since a one unit decrease in t 
will reduce tax revenue by n2 P dollars and λ is the vote opportunity cost of one dollar.  Thus, the agency will set t so 
that the number of votes gained from the last unit decrease in t is equal to the number of votes lost by not putting the 
forgone tax revenue to some other vote generating use, such as increasing wages. 
 
Expressions (11) and (12) can be combined, giving 
 
_   n1∂p1/∂w + nd ∂p2/∂E(D) d ∂pd/∂w =  n1  
              n2 ∂p2/∂(tP) P                          n2P.                                                    (16) 
 
This is the familiar form of the maximizing condition, that is, the ratio of the marginal vote products should 
equal the ratio of the marginal vote costs. 
 
Consider the government employer trading increased votes from employees by raising wages for decreased 
votes from citizens by raising taxes, so that total votes remain constant.  The rate at which this tradeoff can be made 
is given by the expression on the left-hand side of (16).  All combinations of w and t which generate a given level of 
votes describe an isovote curve with slope, dw/dt, given by the left-hand side of (16).  Given the signs of the first 
and second order derivatives specified previously, these isovote curves will be increasing at a decreasing rate, with 
V increasing in a southeasterly direction. 
 
The employer’s budget constraint from (8) can be written as               
 
t = pxX – O + n1    w, with ∂t/∂w = n1/n2P.                                                         (17) 
        n2P        n2P 
 
This is the right-hand side of (16) and indicates the rate at which t must rise to finance increases in w. 
 
The vote maximizing equilibrium in (16) appears graphically as the familiar tangency of the constraint with 
an isovote curve.  This is an explicit model of the political process of public employee wage determination, which 
suggests specifically the ways employees and citizens can influence wages and taxes and has implications for the 
circumstances under which each group will be relatively more successful.  
 
EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE VARIATION OF WAGES BY SIZE OF POLITICAL JURISDICTION 
 
This section presents the empirical implications of the model for the variation of wages by size of political 
jurisdiction first developed in Heiney (2012).  In the model the size of the political jurisdiction would be measured 
by n2.   
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Consider an increase in n2 with nd held constant.  From the denominator of the left-hand side of (16), an 
increase in n2 results in a larger number of votes in opposition to an increase in t, and the slopes of the isovotes are 
reduced, resulting in a lower equilibrium w and t.  From the denominator of the right-hand side of (16), an increase 
in n2 reduces the slope of the constraint and has a positive substitution effect and a positive vote output effect on w.  
However, the number of citizens also affects the degree of uncertainty with respect to citizens’ support.  If a larger 
population, or any other factor, makes the agency more uncertain about how much citizens’ support will decrease in 
response to an increase in t, this will be reflected in the function p2(tP).  Specifically, the amount of support the 
agency expects to lose in response to an increase in t will be smaller, that is, ∂2V2/∂t∂U = n2P∂
2
p2/∂(tP)∂U > 0, in 
which U is any factor which increases uncertainty.  This will result in an increase in equilibrium w given by 
 
dw = 1 {n1n2
2
P
2
   ∂2p2   } >0                                                                                                          (18) 
dU    Δ              ∂(tP)∂U 
 
Conversely, if C is any factor which makes the agency more certain of the amount support will decrease 
when t increases, then ∂2V2/∂t∂C = n2P∂
2
p2/∂(tP)∂C is negative and, therefore, dw/dC and dt/dC are negative. 
 
The effects of a change in n2 are, therefore, given by 
 
dw = 1 {n1n2P
2
   ∂p2   + λn1n2P
2
 – n1n2tP
3
 ∂2p2  + n1n2
2
P
2
 ∂2p2     }                                                       (19) 
dn2   Δ              ∂(tP)                                 ∂(tP)
2                      ∂(tP)∂n2 
 
The first term in (19) shows the negative effect on w of an increase in n2 because there are now more 
citizen votes in opposition to an increase in t.  The second term is the positive substitution effect, and the third term 
is the positive vote output effect of an increase in n2.  The fourth term is the positive effect of the increased 
uncertainty of citizens’ positions which results from an increase in n2, given in (18).  The first and second terms can 
be written as  
 
n1P(n2 P∂p2/∂(tP) + λn2  P) 
 
which equals zero by the first order condition in (12).  The remaining terms indicate that dw/dn2 is unambiguously 
positive. 
 
Therefore a clear empirical implication of this theory of public sector wage determination is that wages will 
be higher in larger communities ceteris paribus.  This has implications for public policy decisions.  For example, in 
Illinois, Governor Quinn is proposing to consolidate smaller school districts into larger ones to save money.  
However, if the empirical implications of this model hold, consolidation of smaller districts into larger ones will also 
result in higher teacher salaries, and it is not clear that the consolidation will result in savings.  Certainly, the savings 
will not be as large as otherwise expected.  
 
WILL POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION REALLY SAVE MONEY? 
 
This section presents data for salaries of Illinois public school districts by district type and enrollment size 
which is consistent with the empirical implication of the theory presented here that wages will be higher in larger 
communities, ceteris paribus.  This provides the basis for calculations of the amounts by which salaries would 
increase if smaller districts were consolidated into larger ones.  
 
In Illinois school districts are of three types: elementary districts, secondary districts, and unit districts 
which cover both the elementary and secondary levels.  The tables below provide the 50
th
 percentile of the beginning 
and maximum levels of the salary distributions for teachers with the bachelor’s degree and the master’s degree.  
Table I provides this information for elementary districts; Table II, for secondary districts; and Table III for unit 
districts.  In general it will be noted that salaries are higher in secondary districts than in elementary districts, but 
lower in unit districts than in secondary districts.  The important point for the purposes of this paper is that, with few 
exceptions, salaries increase with district size in all three tables. 
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There are 372 elementary districts, 98 secondary districts, and 386 unit districts.  The largest number of 
districts in the elementary category is the 135 districts with enrollment under 500.  This would be the sensible place 
to begin considering consolidation.  Suppose that two school districts in this smallest size category were 
consolidated.  The data in Table I suggest that the salaries of beginning teachers with bachelor’s degrees who are at 
the 50
th
 percentile of the salary distribution would increase at least 11.3%.  The beginning salary for teachers with 
master’s degrees at the 50th percentile would have their salaries increase by 12.9%.  Teachers with bachelor’s 
degrees at the maximum level would have salaries 14% higher.  The salaries of teachers with master’s degrees at the 
maximum level would be 26% higher.   
 
If three districts in this category were consolidated, beginning salaries for teachers with the bachelor’s 
degree would increase 14.6% and beginning salaries for teachers with the master’s degree would increase 17.2%.  
At the maximum salary levels these increases would be 11.1% and 32.3%.   
 
Table I 
Salaries of Illinois Public School 
Elementary Districts By Enrollment Size 
District Size 
(Enrollment) 
Number Of 
Districts 
Bachelor’s Degree Master’s Degree 
50th Percentile 50th Percentile 
Beginning Maximum Beginning Maximum 
Salary Salary Salary Salary 
Under 500 135 32,796 48,390 35,729 55,925 
500-999 75 36,509 55,163 40,334 70,452 
1,000-2,999 109 37,575 53,760 41,871 73,963 
3,000-5,999 44 38,691 56,591 43,105 77,258 
6,000-11,999 6 41,298 60,737 46,588 87,772 
12,000 & above 3 40,945 75,328 46,137 92,896 
Source: Illinois Teacher Salary Study, 2010-2011, Table 12, page 8 
 
Table II 
Salaries of Illinois Public School 
Secondary Districts By Enrollment Size 
District Size 
(Enrollment) 
Number Of 
Districts 
Bachelor’s Degree Master’s Degree 
50th Percentile 50th Percentile 
Beginning Maximum Beginning Maximum 
Salary Salary Salary Salary 
Under 500 18 35,867 53,113 38,729 60,771 
500-999 21 37,528 53,525 42,394 69,530 
1,000-2,999 31 40,353 58,810 44,943 86,662 
3,000-5,999 22 47,480 66,546 51,537 100,696 
6,000-11,999 6 48,184 59,529 51,798 97,190 
12,000 & above 2 49,091 67,281 54,248 105,815 
Source: Illinois Teacher Salary Study, 2010-2011, Table 12, page 8 
 
Table III 
Salaries of Illinois Public School 
Unit Districts By Enrollment Size 
District Size 
(Enrollment) 
Number Of 
Districts 
Bachelor’s Degree Master’s Degree 
50th Percentile 50th Percentile 
Beginning Maximum Beginning Maximum 
Salary Salary Salary Salary 
Under 500 90 31,697 46,748 34,286 53,909 
500-999 114 33,001 49,320 36,347 57,578 
1,000-2,999 120 34,932 54,064 38,296 63,053 
3,000-5,999 24 36,000 55,615 40,227 70,850 
6,000-11,999 21 38,902 58,375 43,412 72,624 
12,000 & above 17 40,034 53,456 44,527 76,483 
Source: Illinois Teacher Salary Study, 2010-2011, Table 12, page 8 
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Other estimates can be made from Tables II and III, but it appears that consolidation of two or three of the 
smallest school districts in Illinois could result in salaries which are at least 10% higher and which could be as much 
as 25% to 30% higher.  Therefore, it is not obvious that consolidation of public school districts will save money. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper provides a model of public sector wage determination with the empirical implication that public 
sector wages will be higher in larger political jurisdictions, ceteris paribus.  Data for public school teachers’ salaries 
in Illinois confirm this empirical implication with higher salaries in larger districts.  These data provide rough 
estimates that consolidation among the smallest size districts would increase salaries from 10% to 30%.  This is an 
important finding when answering the question: Will political consolidation really save money?  Dougerty (2011) 
provides an additional perspective on this question with respect to the consolidation of townships in Illinois.    
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